



WORKING PAPER NO. 09-21/R 









First Version: April 29, 2009 
This version: May 12, 2011 
 
   1





Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
First Version: April 29, 2009 
This version: May 12, 2011 
                                                 
* The author thanks Mitchell Berlin, Philip Bond, Paul Calem, Larry Cordell, Will Goetzmann, Bob Hunt, David 
Musto, Leonard Nakamura, Richard Rosen, Amit Seru, Anthony Sanders, Nicholas Souleles, and Paul Willen, as 
well as participants at the Wharton Macro Finance Lunch, the FDIC Mortgage Default Symposium, the Yale 
Financial Crisis Conference, the Mid-Atlantic Research Conference, Ben-Gurion University, and Tel-Aviv 
University. I am particularly indebted to Bob O’Loughlin, Mathan Glezer, and Ted Wiles for outstanding research 
support. 
† Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Ten Independence Mall, Philadelphia, PA 19106.  
E-mail: ronel.elul@phil.frb.org. Tel: (215) 574-3965. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and 
do not necessarily represent policies or positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve 
System. This paper is available free of charge at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/ 
publications/working-papers/.   2
SECURITIZATION AND MORTGAGE DEFAULT 
ABSTRACT 
 
The academic literature, the popular press, and policymakers have all debated 
securitization’s contribution to the poor performance of mortgages originated in the run-up to the 
recent crisis. Theoretical arguments have been advanced on both sides, but the lack of suitable 
data has made it difficult to assess them empirically. We examine this issue by using a loan-level 
data set from LPS Analytics, covering approximately two-thirds of the mortgages originated in 
2005 and 2006, and including both securitized and nonsecuritized loans.  
We find evidence that privately securitized loans do indeed perform worse than 
observably similar, nonsecuritized loans. Moreover, this effect is strongest in prime mortgage 
markets, which have not been studied in the previous literature. For example, a typical prime 
loan becomes delinquent at a 20 percent higher rate if it is privately securitized, ceteris paribus. 
This is consistent with the existence of adverse selection; that is, that lenders used information 
not available to investors to securitize loans that were riskier than they otherwise appeared. By 
contrast, for subprime mortgages, the impact of private securitization is concentrated in low or 
no-documentation loans; this latter result is consistent with previous work such as Keys et al. 
(2009).   3
INTRODUCTION  
One of the notable innovations of the mortgage boom was the dramatic increase in 
private securitization; by 2005 it made up over 50 percent of all new securitizations (Figure 1). 
This has been tied to a dramatic expansion in the provision of mortgage credit, particularly to 
segments of the population that had not been served in the past, such as subprime borrowers. 
Conversely, the dramatic increase in mortgage default rates following the collapse of the 
subprime bubble has led many to blame securitization. It is commonly asserted that issuers had 
less incentive to screen those loans that were sold to securitized pools and that this encouraged a 
decline in lending standards. This argument has been featured prominently in the popular press 
and has also been echoed by policymakers. For example, the recently released U.S Treasury 
report on regulatory reform notes that “[t]he lack of transparency and standards in markets for 
securitized loans helped to weaken underwriting standards,” and the report goes on to propose 
that issuers be required to maintain a 5 percent stake in any securitization.
1 This has also found 
support in recent academic work, for example, Mian and Sufi (2009), and Keys et al. (2009). 
On the other hand, others (most prominently, Gorton, 2008) have pointed out that issuers 
retained substantial exposure even after the mortgages are securitized. Some of this was explicit, 
since issuers often continued to service mortgages they had sold, or they retained senior tranches 
of CDOs containing these mortgages. But it was also implicit; the clearest evidence of this can 
be found in the credit card ABS market. For example, Gorton and Souleles (2007) show that 
prices paid by investors in credit card ABS take into account issuers’ ability to bail out their 
ABS. Thus, issuers’ incentives need not necessarily be misaligned with those of investors. This 
view is also supported by earlier work on the securitization of prime mortgages, in particular 
                                                 
1 http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf   4
Ambrose et al. (2005), who found that securitized loans tended to perform better than similar 
nonsecuritized loans. 
More generally, several theories have been proposed for why lenders securitize loans. 
One is regulatory arbitrage; i.e., lenders sell loans in order to remove them from their balance 
sheets and thereby conserve costly capital (James, 1987). Others have suggested that 
securitization serves to reduce the scope of assets subject to bankruptcy costs (Gorton and 
Souleles, 2007). Note that for both of these motivations, there is generally an incentive to 
securitize safer assets.  In the case of regulatory arbitrage, this is because regulations assign the 
same capital charge to broad classes of assets, and in the latter case because safer assets make it 
easier to design bankruptcy-remote structures. 
By contrast, two other motivations for securitization imply that riskier loans would be 
sold. The first is risk-sharing or diversification, particularly of interest-rate, credit, or house-price 
risk (Kendall, 1998). A final reason why riskier loans might be securitized is adverse selection, 
or cream-skimming. That is, the desire on the part of lenders to take advantage of private 
information that is available to them, but not to potential investors (see for example, Demarzo 
and Duffie, 1999, and Parlour and Plantin, 2008). In contrast to securitization motivated by risk-
sharing, however, such loans will be riskier even after controlling for observable information 
available to investors.
2  
In this paper we find that for prime mortgages, private-securitized loans do indeed 
perform significantly worse than non-private-securitized loans, after conditioning on publicly 
available information; in particular,  they default at more than 20 percent higher rates. This is 
consistent with adverse selection, that is, with lenders securitizing loans that were riskier than 
                                                 
2 Another reason why securitized loans may perform worse is monitoring. This is discussed further below.   5
they otherwise appeared. Given the large number of prime loans that were originated over this 
period, this difference in default rates is economically important.  
By contrast, in our baseline results we find that the securitized subprime loans actually 
default at lower rates, ceteris paribus. However, we show that this is completely explained by 
“early defaulting” loans. Lenders may well have originally intended for these loans to be sold to 
securitized pools, but they were not able to do so because the loans defaulted before they had a 
chance to sell them. Taking this into account reverses the sign of the securitization coefficient for 
subprime loans and for adjustable-rate subprime mortgages, again results in private-securitized 
loans that are significantly riskier than observably similar non-private-securitized loans.  
We also interact private securitization with the documentation type of the mortgage. As 
Keys et al. (2009) suggest, the asymmetry of information between lenders and investors is 
likelier to be more pronounced for these loans, and thus we should expect a stronger effect from 
securitization. For prime mortgages, we do find that the effect of private securitization is 
modestly stronger for low and no-doc loans, although securitized loans are in fact riskier for all 
documentation types.  For subprime loans, however, the effect of securitization is dramatically 
larger when there is low or no-documentation. And indeed, for subprime FRM, full-
documentation loans exhibit no higher risk when they are securitized; the entire impact of private 
securitization is for low documentation loans. These results on subprime loans are consistent 
with the findings of Keys et al. (2009). 
Since the LPS data that we use do not contain data on secondary markets, we cannot 
completely rule out the possibility that investors understood that such a deterioration in standards 
had taken place and that either the prices paid for the securities
3 or the structure of the MBS 
reflected this additional risk (see Gorton and Souleles, 2007, for an example of this in credit card 
                                                 
3 We do control for the interest rates on the individual loans.   6
securitizations, and also Adelino, 2009). Nevertheless, even if this were the case, securitization 
motivated by adverse selection could still be inefficient, as bad loans would drive out the good – 
restricting lenders to more expensive on-balance-sheet financing to fund high-quality loans. 
 
RELATED LITERATURE 
This paper is not the first one to examine the impact of securitization on default risk. One 
strand of the literature, most notably Mian and Sufi (2009), compares ZIP-code level 
securitization and default rates.
4 They find that those regions in which subprime securitization 
expanded most rapidly were also those in which default rates subsequently rose. However, their 
reliance on aggregate data makes interpreting the results difficult. In particular, without detailed 
information on loan characteristics, this approach does not allow us to easily distinguish the risk-
sharing motivation for securitization from adverse selection.  
Several other papers have used loan-level information to study the effect of 
securitization. The most prominent of these is Keys et al.  (2009). They use loan-level data, but 
only for securitized loans (from the Loan Performance [LP] ABS database). Thus, they must use 
an instrumental variables approach to characterize loans that are “harder” to securitize (those 
with credit scores just below 620) and find that these loans are indeed less likely to default, 
ceteris paribus. Although this is an ingenious approach that also addresses the issue of the 
endogeneity of securitization (discussed further below), several issues arise.  
First, some have argued that this instrument is relatively weak, since many subprime 
MBS did indeed contain substantial numbers of loans below this cutoff. For example, in the New 
Century securitization studied by Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008), 57 percent of all loans have 
                                                 
4 See also Calem, Henderson, and Liles (2010).     7
FICO scores below 620. Furthermore, work by Bubb and Kaufmann (2009) suggests that this 
“620-discontinuity” also plays a role in the performance of nonsecuritized loans.
5  
From the perspective of our paper, however, the key limitation of the analysis in Keys et 
al. (2009) is that they can examine only the effect of securitization for a narrow subset of loans 
— those in the neighborhood of their cutoff. And, indeed, their analysis focuses on subprime 
loans, and they find a significant effect on only those subprime mortgages with low or no 
documentation of income. By contrast, our approach allows us to examine a much broader 
segment of the mortgage market. In particular, our main result - that prime securitized loans are 
the ones in which the negative impact of securitization was greatest - could not be established by 
using a data set (like LP) that required restricting attention to loans with FICO scores around 
620. 
Two other papers have used loan-level data sets that include information on both 
securitized and nonsecuritized loans. The first, Ambrose et al. (2005), considers loans originated 
by a single lender between 1995 and 1997. As in this paper, they are interested in determining 
whether asymmetric information motivates securitization and, like us, compare the conditional 
default rates on securitized and nonsecuritized loans. As discussed above, they find that 
securitized loans default at lower rates than nonsecuritized loans and conclude that either 
securitization is in fact motivated by regulatory arbitrage or that reputational incentives are 
sufficiently strong to keep lenders from taking advantage their information. These results stand 
in contrast to ours, but it is important to note that our paper considers a much larger set of loans, 
                                                 
5 See also Krainer and Laderman (2009). Some of these criticisms are addressed by additional analyses that the 
authors undertake in the paper. In particular, they also examine the introduction, and repeal, of anti-predatory 
lending laws in Georgia and New Jersey. The results of this latter analysis are consistent with those of their primary 
approach; during the period that these laws were in force, loans with credit scores slightly above 620 default at 
higher rates than those with scores slightly below. In addition, see Keys et al. (2010) for a more detailed discussion 
of these issues.   8
originated by many different lenders, and that we contrast focus on a time period  in which the 
volume of risky lending (and subsequently, defaults) rose dramatically.  
Another paper, Jiang et al. (2010), uses data on loans originated by a single lender 
between January 2004 and February 2008 (primarily Alt-A and subprime mortgages). They find 
that, while securitized loans were observably riskier than loans retained by lenders (based on ex-
ante information available at the time of origination), their ex-post performance is actually better 
than similar loans held by the lender (similar to Ambrose et al., 2009). They attribute this 
difference to the use of post-origination information by investors deciding whether to allow 
individual loans into securitized pools or not. By contrast, we find that securitized loans perform 
worse, even ex post. However, our results are strongest for prime loans, which are under-
represented in their sample. And like Jiang et al. (2010), we also find evidence that post-




We use loan-level data from the LPS Applied Analytics Inc, data set.
6 These data have 
been used to study the determinants of mortgage default by Elul et al. (2010) and also to examine 
foreclosure outcomes (Piskorski, Seru, and Vig, 2010, and Foote et al., 2009). A more detailed 
description of the data may also be found in Foote el al. (2009). These data are provided by the 
servicers of the loans, and the contributors include nine of the top 10 servicers. 
We focus on first mortgages originated in 2005 and 2006, since coverage of the LPS data 
was not as extensive prior to 2005 (particularly for subprime loans), and since by early 2007 the 
                                                 
6 This data set is also commonly known as the “McDash” data.   9
housing market had already showed signs of deterioration. The LPS data cover about 70 percent 
of all mortgage originations in these years.
7 We impose several additional restrictions in order to 
create a more homogeneous sample: (i) we restrict attention to owner-occupied homes and 
exclude multifamily properties; (ii) we consider the three most common maturities: 15, 30, and 
40 years; (iii) for adjustable-rate mortgages we restrict attention to hybrid-ARMs with initial 
fixed-rate periods of 24, 36, 60, 84 or 120 months; and (iv) to reduce survival bias, we also 
restrict attention to loans that entered the LPS data set within 12 months of their origination date. 
This sample represents about 60 percent of all of the first mortgages in the LPS data. We follow 
our borrowers through April 2009. 
We divide our sample into four distinct subsamples: prime FRM, prime ARM, subprime 
FRM, and subprime ARMs.  A loan is categorized as prime or subprime based on the servicer’s 
classification; note that there is no separate category for Alt-A loans - depending on the issuer, 
they may be classified as either prime or subprime. Except for prime FRM, where we draw a 50 




The LPS data set is divided into a “static” file, whose values generally do not change 
over time, and a “dynamic” file. The static data set contains information obtained at the time of 
the original underwriting, such as the loan amount, house price, (origination) FICO score, 
documentation status, source of the loan (e.g., whether it was broker-originated), property 
                                                 
7 For example, 7.4 million first mortgage originations were recorded in LPS in 2005, as compared to 10.5 million in 
the HMDA data, and 6.4 million in 2006, as compared to 8.6 million in HMDA.    10
location (zip code), type of loan (fixed-rate, ARM, prime, subprime, IO, Option-ARM, etc.), the 
prepayment penalty period (if any).  
The dynamic file is updated monthly, and among other variables, it contains the status of 
the loan (current, 30 days delinquent, 60 days, etc.), the  current interest rate (since this changes 
over time for ARMs), current balance, and investor type (private-securitized, GNMA, FNMA, 
FHLMC, portfolio, FHA). The investor type variable is discussed in greater detail below. 
We add in county-level unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and also 
merge in house price index data from the FHFA (the MSA-level index when available, otherwise 
the rural or state-level index). Since the house price index is available quarterly, we then follow 
the mortgages quarterly as well.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
We estimate dynamic logit models for mortgage default that are equivalent to discrete 
duration models.
8 If we find that private-securitized mortgages default at higher rates, after 
controlling for observables, we will conclude that this is support for the adverse selection 
hypothesis of securitization. 
Our dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating when a mortgage first 
becomes 60+ days delinquent, i.e., is first reported as having missed two or more payments.
9 
This is a relatively early definition of default, as compared to a foreclosure, which can occur 
many months later. We use this early definition for two reasons. First, state laws governing 
                                                 
8 As in Gross and Souleles (2002), we use a fifth-order polynomial in loan age to model  
the associated hazard function. We also include state, quarter, and origination quarter dummy variables. 
In a previous version of this paper, we obtained similar baseline results when using a Cox proportional hazard 
model. 
9 We use the Mortgage Bankers Association  (MBA) definition of delinquency:  a loan increases its delinquency 
status if a monthly payment is not received by the end of the day immediately preceding the loan’s next payment 
due date.   11
foreclosure differ widely, and this can have an effect on the length of time it takes to conclude a 
foreclosure.
10 Also, whether a delinquent loan is securitized or not may also affect the ease of 
modifying it and hence of avoiding foreclosure, i.e., monitoring (Piskorski, Seru, and Vig, 2010, 
and Agarwal et el, 2011).
11 We further address the issue of monitoring below. 
The independent variables include standard mortgage and borrower characteristics from 
the LPS data set (e.g., initial LTV and origination FICO score), all taken from the time of 
origination. One exception is the investor type, which is determined after origination, as 
described below. We also estimate the current LTV, dividing the current mortgage balance (from 
the LPS data) by an estimate of the current house price. The latter is obtained by updating the 
house value at origination, using the change in the local house price index since origination. We 
also compute the change in the county-level unemployment rate over the previous year to capture 
the effect of shocks. 
Recall that the data set is constructed to be quarterly. To clarify the timing, we consider 
whether mortgage i defaults in a given quarter, i.e., in months t+1, t+2, or t+3. The 
independent variables are all lagged relative to this quarter. The LPS mortgage control variables, 
most notably the first mortgage balance, come from month t. To be conservative, the variables 
from the other data sets are lagged one month further. The bureau data are from the last month of 
the previous quarter, i.e., month t-1. The house price index is the average for the previous 
quarter, i.e., over months t-3, t-2, and t-1. Finally, the change in the county unemployment rate is 
taken from months t-13 to t-1. 
   
                                                 
10 Many papers have studied the effect of these state laws on foreclosure outcomes; for example, Ghent and Kudlyak 
(2009) use the LPS data to address laws that restrict deficiency judgments. 
11 But see Foote et al. (2009) for an opposing view.   12
The Investor Type 
The final independent variable that we include in our estimations is the private 
securitization dummy, which is derived from the investor type. Since this is the key variable in 
our analysis, we now discuss its construction it in more detail. The investor types available in the 
LPS data set are “portfolio,” “GNMA,” “FNMA,” “FHLMC,” and “private-securitized;” for the 
purposes of this paper we combine FNMA and FHLMC-securitized loans into a single category: 
“GSE”. These investor types are dynamic and can change every month. In Figure 2 we plot the 
fraction of loans that change investor type as a function of the time since origination.  
The fact that the investor type can change over time is particularly important in 
determining the “intended” investor type at origination. Because of the time it takes a loan to go 
through the securitization pipeline, 70 percent of all mortgages are initially recorded as 
“portfolio” loans when they first appear in the data set; therefore, simply using the investor type 
at origination would clearly not capture the intended type. On the other hand, a default can also 
lead the loan to be transferred to another investor (for example, back to the originating lender in 
the case of early defaults). For instance, loans on which the second payment was missed (our 
definition of default), are one-third more likely to change investor type than nondefaulting 
loans.
12 In light of this, we define the “final investor type” to be the type reported at six months 
from loan origination. This is early enough to avoid most defaults (but see our discussion of 
early defaults, below), yet far enough from the origination date to reduce the likelihood that the 
loan is still “in pipeline”.
13 Table 1 reports the distribution of loans by final investor type, for 
each product. For our estimations, we also define a binary variable, which captures whether or 
not the final investor type is “private-securitized.” 
                                                 
12 The investor type is even more likely to change in later stages of default  
13 This is also the definition used by Bubb and Kaufman (2009). In an earlier version of this paper we considered a 
different definition of the investor type and obtained nearly identical estimation results.   13
ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
Introduction 
To motivate our analysis, we begin by plotting nonparametric default hazard functions 
for both private-securitized and non-private-securitized loans, in Figure 3. The x-axis gives the 
mortgage age (in months) and the y-axis gives the probability of default in the next quarter, 
conditional on not having defaulted before. Notice that private-securitized prime mortgages 
exhibit significantly higher default risk. For instance, for prime ARMs, the hazard rate of default 
peaks at 1.5 percent per quarter for private-securitized loans, double the peak for non-private-
securitized loans. It is also interesting to observe that the impact of securitization is smaller in the 
subprime market, with non-private-securitized subprime ARMs actually defaulting at lower rates 
early in their lives. As we demonstrate below, this difference is attributable to loans that default 




Tables 3a and 3b report the point estimates and marginal effects for our baseline 
specification. Beginning with the prime subsamples in Table 3a, we first note that the marginal 
effects for the variables commonly used in mortgage default studies have the expected signs. For 
example, for prime FRM, broker-originated loans have a 0.247 percentage point per quarter 
(pp/q) higher risk of default than the omitted category: retail-originated loans. This is a sizable 
effect, relative to a sample average default rate of about 0.9 pp/q. A borrower with a higher FICO 
score is less likely to default, while loans with higher interest rates, larger loans, and loans with 
private mortgage insurance (PMI) are all riskier. The effect of initial LTV is negative for three   14
out of our four subsamples. This may be understood, however, by noting that we also control for 
current LTV (using updated balances and house price indexes), and thus this may reflect the 
effect of sorting on unobservables (for analogous results, see also Berger and Udell, 1990, who 
find that riskier commercial loans tend to have more collateral). Turning now to the variable of 
interest, the private securitization coefficients for the prime subsamples are positive and 
statistically significant. To gauge the economic impact, observe that for prime FRM, the 
marginal effect of private securitization is 0.229 pp/q, and for prime ARMs it is 0.402 pp/q, 
significant compared to the sample average default rates of 0.9 pp/q and 2 pp/q, respectively. 
That is, private-securitized loans default at higher rates, after controlling for observables. As 
discussed above, this supports the hypothesis that lenders use private information to determine 
which loans to securitize. 
For the subprime samples, the majority of the coefficients for the control variables are 
similar. However, the private securitization coefficients are negative; that is, private-securitized 
loans default at lower rates, ceteris paribus. As we now discuss, this is attributable to “early 
defaults.”  
 
Early Default and Securitization 
To understand why private-securitized subprime loans appear to be less risky in the 
baseline results above, it is useful to recall that the vast majority of loans begin as portfolio loans 
and are only transferred to mortgage-backed securities after a period of several months in the 
“pipeline.” Thus, paradoxically, lenders may well have intended to sell very risky loans to 
securitized pools, but were not able to do so because the mortgages defaulted before they had a 
chance to do so. Table 2 reports the fraction of loans that became delinquent within six months   15
of origination: for prime loans this is fairly small, but the proportion is much higher for the 
subprime subsamples: 17 percent of all subprime FRM and 21 percent of all subprime ARMs 
originated during these years.  
To control for this, we rerun our baseline model, but this time we exclude all loans that 
became delinquent within six months of origination. The point estimates and marginals for 
private securitization are reported in Table 4. Observe that this has very little impact on the 
results for prime loans, which is not surprising as only a small fraction of loans fall into this 
category.
14 The effect on subprime loans is much more dramatic however. Observe that the sign 
of the securitization coefficient is reversed, and for adjustable-rate subprime mortgages, it results 
in securitized loans that are significantly riskier. Thus as in Jiang et al. (2010), we find that post-
origination selection may have improved the performance of the pool of securitized loans.   
  Given the important role played by early default in the subprime market, for the 
remainder of the paper we restrict all estimations involving the subprime samples to mortgages 
which no payments were missed during the first six months following origination. We do not 
impose this restriction on the prime subsamples, although the results would have been little 
changed had we done so. 
  
Documentation Type 
Keys et al. (2009) found that the extra default risk for subprime securitized loans is 
concentrated in those with low or no documentation. They argue that these results support the 
existence of adverse selection, as low documentation loans are precisely those for which the 
asymmetry of information is greatest. That is, given the paucity of verified “hard” information 
                                                 
14 In fact, the effect of private securitization is modestly smaller for both prime subsamples than in our baseline 
specifications, likely because we have eliminated some defaulting loans from the sample.   16
for these borrowers, lenders may well have collected additional “soft” information, which was 
not shared with investors. Thus, we also interact the private securitization indicator with the 
documentation type of the loan (that is, whether income and assets are documented). The results 
are reported in Table 5.  
For prime mortgages, we find that while private-securitized loans are riskier for all 
documentation types, the effect is indeed modestly stronger for low and no-doc loans.  
Furthermore, for subprime loans, the effect of securitization is much more pronounced when 
there is low or no-documentation. Indeed, for subprime FRM, full-documentation loans are in 
fact no riskier when securitized; the entire impact of securitization is concentrated in low 
documentation loans. This is consistent with the findings of Keys et al. (2009). 
 
Adverse Selection vs. Monitoring 
As discussed earlier, an alternative explanation that has been proposed for the higher 
default risk of private-securitized loans is monitoring; that is, servicers have less incentive to 
modify or otherwise work out loans that they do not own. Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010) find 
that, conditional on being seriously delinquent (90+ days late), loans that are private-securitized 
are more likely to be foreclosed. Similarly, Agarwal et al. (2011) show that distressed bank-held 
loans are more likely to be renegotiated than similar securitized mortgages. By contrast, Adelino 
et al. (2010) find little effect from securitization.  
Note that even if securitization affects servicers’ post-origination behavior, this does not 
rule out the existence of adverse selection. However, in order to ensure that the results that we 
obtain truly reflect lender behavior at origination, we rerun our model using the earliest possible 
definition of default – the missed payment (i.e., a first delinquency of 30+ days in the quarter).   17
This is almost certainly the first sign of trouble that servicers would observe for a mortgage, and 
so the securitization coefficients in this case would isolate the effect at origination.
15 The cost of 
using this early definition is that a single missed payment is often due to random factors (such as 
forgetting to mail a payment), which potentially increases the standard errors of our estimates, 
and thus for the remainder of the paper, we revert to our original definition of default. 
In Table 6 we report these results. The effect of private securitization is positive and 
significant for the prime mortgage samples, just as reported above, and the coefficients on the 
other control variables (not reported) were also qualitatively similar to those obtained earlier. 
This supports our conclusion that our results measure the effect of adverse selection at 
origination. 
 
Lender Fixed Effects 
One of the limitations of the LPS data set is that it does not include information on the 
identity of the lender. This is information that investors could have observed. Thus, its absence 
leaves open the possibility that the effect of private securitization can be attributed to a few 
lenders who were known to originate riskier loans, something that investors would have 
recognized. That is, lender reputation may have mitigated the effect of adverse selection.  
In order to address this concern, we merge our LPS data with the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act data (HMDA).
 16 This gives us an anonymous identifier for each lender, which 
allows us to rerun our earlier estimations with lender fixed effects.
17  
                                                 
15 However, servicers, could in principle, seek out borrowers who have always been current but are otherwise at risk 
of default.  
16 Our procedure is similar to that described in Haughwout, Mayer and Tracy (2009). Mortgages were matched 
based on the ZIP code of the property, the date when the mortgage originated (within 5 days), the origination 
amount (within $500), the purpose of the loan (purchase, refinance or other), the type of  loan (conventional, VA 
guaranteed, FHA guaranteed, or other), occupancy type (owner-occupied or non-owner-occupied), and lien status 
(first lien or other).  The match rate was approximately 50 percent.     18
The point estimates and marginal effects are reported in Table 7, where we confirm that 
the effect of private securitization is indeed qualitatively similar to that reported above. 
 
Other Investor Types: the GSE’s and Jumbo Mortgages 
In the estimations above, we examined the marginal effect of private securitization, 
combining all other investor types (FHA, GSE, and portfolio) together. But in fact, the 
distribution of these investor types differs widely across mortgage types, as reported in Table 1. 
We now examine their role in greater detail.  
First, we rerun our earlier estimations but now break out all four investor types 
individually. Since the GSE and FHA presence in the subprime ARM market was negligible, we 
restrict attention to the prime FRM, prime ARM, and subprime FRM subsamples. Our results are 
reported in Table 8. 
In every case, observe that private-securitized mortgages are riskier than loans retained in 
portfolio (the omitted category); the effect is of the same magnitude as in our earlier estimations 
(with all non-private-securitized loans combined together). Similarly, FHA loans are also always 
riskier. In the prime markets, private-securitized mortgages are also riskier than GSE loans, with 
GSE adjustable-rate mortgages even less risky than similar portfolio loans. For subprime FRM, 
our point estimates for GSE loans are higher than for private-securitized, but the difference is not 
statistically significant. 
Next, we consider the binary choice between private securitization and retaining loans in 
portfolio. To do so, we rerun our estimations while restricting our sample to “jumbo” mortgages 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 The anonymity is due to restrictions imposed by the data provider. For tractability, we further restrict attention to 
loans originated by the top 25 lenders in each subsample.   19
alone, that is, loans that are too large to meet the GSE underwriting criteria.
18 In this case, the 
only admissible investor types are portfolio and private-securitized.
19  
Table 9 reports the fraction of jumbo loans that are private-securitized for each of the 
remaining subsamples. Since the GSEs had little market share in the subprime market (Table 1), 
it is not surprising that the vast majority of jumbo subprime mortgages are private-securitized. In 
addition, in the prime FRM jumbo subsample, the private securitization rate is also high, most 
likely because securitization is a way for lenders to hedge the interest rate risk of fixed-rate 
mortgages. It is only in the prime ARM segment that lenders retain a significant portion of loans 
(36 percent).  
The effect of private securitization in the jumbo prime ARM subsample (Table 9) is 
positive and economically significant – and of the same magnitude as for the overall sample in 
Table 3. This is consistent with the observation above that lenders retained many of these prime 
ARMs – thus securitizing only worse loans was feasible. For jumbo prime FRM, while the effect 
of private securitization is still positive, it is smaller than that for the overall sample. Again, since 
retaining fixed-rate loans in portfolio is costlier, and since the GSE market is not available to 
purchase the better-quality loans, it is not surprising that the effect of private securitization will 
be more modest. Finally, just as for the overall sample, the effect of private securitization for 




                                                 
18 In 2005, the conforming loan limit for single-family homes was $359,650, and in 2006 it was $417,000.  
19 FHA loans are also excluded, as FHA-insured loans also cannot exceed the conforming loan limit. We drop the 
small subset of loans that are above the conforming loan limit for the year of origination but are nevertheless 
recorded as GSE (or FHA). As they are heavily concentrated in the last months of the year, these mortgages likely 
reflect loans that only became conforming under the next year’s (higher) limit. 
20 Recall that the entire effect of private securitization was concentrated in low-documentation loans for this 
subsample.   20
CONCLUSIONS 
Using a data set that includes information on both securitized and nonsecuritized mortgages, 
we have demonstrated robust evidence that private-securitized loans originated during 2005-
2006 were riskier than comparable nonsecuritized loans. These results are consistent with the 
existence of adverse selection between lenders and investors. For subprime mortgages this effect 
is concentrated in loans with low or no documentation of income and assets, although prime 
private-securitized mortgages are riskier overall (although the effect is stronger for low/no-doc 
loans). These results are economically important because of the much larger size of the prime 
mortgage market. 
More work is needed to examine whether investors fairly priced the extra risk of these loans; 
something which our data do not allow us to fully address. It is also important to further 
investigate the private information that lenders might have had available to them.  21
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APPENDIX – FIGURES AND TABLES 
 




                                                 
21 Source: Inside Mortgage Finance   25
 









































Table 1 – Investor Type at Six Months 
 
   Prime Prime  Subprime  Subprime 
   FRM ARM  FRM  ARM 
FHA  0.09  0.01 0.00 0.00 
GSE  0.70  0.37 0.16 0.00 
Portfolio  0.05  0.20 0.04 0.09 
 
Private-securitized  0.16  0.42 0.81 0.91 
Not Private-securitized   26
Table 2 – Variable Means 
 
     Prime Prime  Subprime  Subprime 
      FRM ARM FRM ARM 
Default in Next Quarter/LHS (%)  0.89% 2.01% 5.45% 7.75% 
Loan Age (mo.)  19.2 18.8 16.4 13.6 
Private-securitized  0.16 0.42 0.81 0.91 
Interest Rate (%)  6.1 6.0 7.7 7.9 
FICO at Origination  712 712 609 609 
ln(initial loan amount)  12.0 12.5 11.9 12.0 
Initial LTV  0.73 0.74 0.77 0.80 
Initial LTV=80%  0.13 0.24 0.18 0.26 
Interest-Only Loan  0.03 0.61 0.04 0.16 
Option-ARM  -    0.11  -    0.27 
Jumbo      0.06 0.28 0.06 0.10 
Refinancing  0.45 0.38 0.73 0.47 
Cash-out Refi.  0.22 0.14 0.59 0.35 
Loan has PMI  0.14 0.05 0.01 0.04 
Transferred to Servicer  0.09 0.25 0.31 0.26 
Prepayment Penalty  0.02 0.09 0.65 0.78 
Correspondent Orig.  0.30 0.14 0.19 0.14 
Broker Orig.  0.16 0.15 0.18 0.34 
Low/No-Documentation  0.16 0.20 0.05 0.15 
Condo      0.11 0.20 0.06 0.11 
Current LTV  0.67 0.69 0.73 0.75 
Unemp Change - Past Yr (%)  0.39 0.38 0.29  -0.06 
Delinquent within First 6 Months  0.04 0.07 0.17 0.21 
Term (yrs.)      
15      10.1 0.0 4.6 0.0 
30      89.3 99.6 85.5 89.1 
40     0.6  0.4  9.9  10.9 
ARM Fixed Period (mo.)      
24     -    14.2  -    78.6 
36     -    9.1  -    19.2 
60     -    48.9  -    2.1 
84     -    14.1  -    0.0 
120     -    13.8  -    0.0   27
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Table 3a: Baseline Estimation – Prime Mortgages
22 
 



































































































Term: 30 years 0.184
*** 0.013 0.150
*** 0.010 0.034 0.202 0.057 0.340
Term: 40 years 0.406
*** 0.025 0.367
*** 0.026 0.172 0.204 0.312 0.345
















Prime FRM Prime ARM
                                                 
22 Dependent variable is 60+ days delinquent in next three months, with subsequent observations dropped after the 
first such default. Quintic in loan age and dummies for state, origination quarter, and calendar time are not reported. 
Baseline categories: 15-year term, 2/28 ARM, single-family property (not condo), full-documentation. Refinancing 
is relative to purchase loans (cashout refi is the extra risk on top of refinancing). Private-securitized status at six 
months from origination. Source: LPS Analytics.   29
Table 3b: Baseline Estimation - Subprime Mortgages
23 
 


















*** 0.000 0.000 0.000





















*** 0.007 -0.239 0.047
Jumbo -0.038
** 0.015 -0.191
























































Term: 30 years 0.235
*** 0.020 1.053
*** 0.082 -0.264 0.346 -2.003 2.901
Term: 40 years 0.553
*** 0.023 2.842
*** 0.105 -0.224 0.346 -1.727 2.901
















Subprime FRM Subprime ARM
 
                                                 
23 Dependent variable is 60+ days delinquent in next three months, with subsequent observations dropped after the 
first such default. Quintic in loan age and dummies for state, origination quarter, and calendar time are  not reported. 
Baseline categories: 15-year term, 2/28 ARM, single-family property (not condo), full-documentation. Refinancing 
is relative to purchase loans (cashout refi is the extra risk on top of refinancing). Private-securitized status at six 
months from origination. Source: LPS Analytics.   30
Table 4: No Early Default
24 
 
Effect of Private Securitization  
      Coeff.  SE  Marginal  SE 
Prime FRM  0.261 0.009  0.197%  0.007% 
Prime ARM  0.249 0.007  0.345%  0.033% 
Subprime FRM  0.006 0.015  0.023%  0.054% 





Table 5: Interaction – Private Securitization and Documentation Type
25 
 
Effect of Private Securitization 
         Marginal  SE 
Prime FRM  Full  0.223% 0.008% 
     Low  0.260% 0.018% 
Prime ARM  Full  0.380% 0.011% 
     Low  0.499% 0.021% 
Subprime FRM  Full  -0.028% 0.055% 
     Low  0.689% 0.154% 
Subprime ARM  Full  0.243% 0.059% 
     Low  0.686% 0.105% 
 
                                                 
24 All samples restricted to loans that did not miss any payments in the first 6 months from the loan origination. 
Other covariates are as in Table 3 and are not reported. 
25 Subprime samples (only) are restricted to loans that did not miss any payments in first 6 months from the loan 
origination. Other covariates are as in Table 3 and are not reported.   31
Table 6: First Missed Payment
26 
 
Effect of Private Securitization 
      LHS: First 30-Day Delinquency 
     Coeff. SE Marginal  SE 
Prime FRM  0.168 0.005  0.334%  0.011% 
Prime ARM  0.136 0.005  0.377%  0.014% 
Subprime FRM  0.019 0.012  0.113%  0.074% 




Table 7: Lender Fixed Effects
27 
 
Effect of Private Securitization 
      RHS: Lender F.E. 
     Coeff. SE Marginal  SE 
Prime FRM  0.291 0.013  0.248%  0.013% 
Prime ARM  0.104 0.011  0.147%  0.016% 
Subprime FRM  0.064 0.029  0.222%  0.097% 






                                                 
26 Dependent variable is 30+-day delinquency in the next three months. Other covariates are as in Table 3 and are 
not reported. Subprime samples (only) are restricted to loans that did not miss any payments in the first 6 months 
from the loan origination. 
27 Restricted to loans originated by top-25 lenders in each subsample; fixed effects for these lenders were included 
but are not reported. Other covariates are as in Table 3 and are not reported. Subprime samples (only) are restricted 
to loans that did not miss any payments in the first 6 months from the loan origination.   32
Table 8: All Investor Types
28 
 
Coeff. SE Marginal SE Coeff. SE Marginal SE Coeff. SE Marginal SE
FHA 0.012 0.014 0.011% 0.013% 0.378 0.030 0.633% 0.057%
GSE -0.113 0.012 -0.098% 0.011% 0.178 0.009 0.272% 0.014% 0.081 0.030 0.293% 0.106%
Private Securit. 0.152 0.013 0.149% 0.013% 0.322 0.008 0.527% 0.012% 0.057 0.024 0.203% 0.083%




Table 9: Jumbo Mortgages
29 
 
Effect of Private Securitization 
Coeff. SE Marginal SE N Priv. Secur. Frac.
Prime FRM 0.122 0.052 0.089% 0.036% 1,225,027 0.92
Prime ARM 0.348 0.013 0.433% 0.015% 3,316,302 0.64
Subprime FRM 0.109 0.101 0.436% 0.391% 104,487 0.97
Subprime ARM 0.013 0.030 0.076% 0.180% 273,432 0.91 
 
 
                                                 
28 The results are relative to loans retained in the lender’s portfolio, the omitted investor type. Subprime ARMs 
dropped as there was negligible GSE and FHA participation in this market. The subprime FRM subsample did not 
include any FHA loans. The subprime FRM sample also further restricted to loans that did not miss any payments in 
the first 6 months from the loan origination. Other covariates are as in Table 3 and are not reported.  
29 The sample was restricted to mortgages larger than the conforming loan limit in the year of origination (“jumbo 
loans”); any remaining loans coded as GSE or FHA were dropped. The effect of private securitization is relative to 
portfolio loans. Subprime samples (only) are restricted to loans that did not miss any payments in the first 6 months 
from the loan origination. Other covariates are as in Table 3 and are not reported. 